United Nations and Challenges of Resettlement and Reintegration of IDP’s in South Sudan, 2011-2018

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Abstract
The plight of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in South Sudan has in recent years become a formidable problem of global significance and implications. Resettlement and reintegration of IDPs and refugees, and their sustainable livelihoods pose serious problems. The data collection and analysis were based on qualitative descriptive method. The paper argues that high levels of human and livelihood insecurity occasioned by incomprehensive disarming of rebels continue to undermine the safety and adequate reintegration and resettlement of IDPs and returning refugees in South Sudan. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme in general and implementation of the reintegration components in particular had not made any headway. There was implementation of DDR in near-total isolation from other conflict resolution mechanisms such as reduction of small and light weapons, peace building, human development, and stabilization initiatives in the country. Again, capacities of local government and civil society to provide effective and equitable support to the ex-combatants and communities are insufficient. Therefore, a comprehensive UN disarmament programme should inculcate other international partners in order to ensure that ex-combatants and all rebel groups are absolutely disarmed, demobilized and effectively reintegrated with their livelihoods revived.

Keywords: IDPs, United Nations, DDR, South Sudan, Peacebuilding, Conflict

Introduction
South Sudan achieved independence on 9 July 2011, but suffers from decades of conflict and neglect, combined with frequent natural disasters and disease outbreaks. As a new nation, South Sudan is building some of its institutions from the very start, with core administrative structures and mechanisms of political representation beginning to emerge. South Sudan has a population of 12,530,717 million (July 2016 estimate) of which 2.3 million (18.8%) live in urban areas, compared to 10.2 million (81.2%) in rural areas (CIA Fact Book, 2016). The December 2013 conflict in South Sudan resulted in rising number of IDPs in the country. This has drawn international attention and support from many countries of the world. The South Sudan conflict was fought between forces of the government and opposition forces (Blanchard, 2014).
Remarkably, South Sudan has remained a focal point in the study of IDPs in recent times. The International Crisis Group estimated in their April 2014 report that over 10,000 people had been killed in the conflict (International Crisis Group, 2014).

The United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), together with its partner – the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has been at the forefront of the project of reintegration of displaced persons in South Sudan. The UNHRC views reintegration as “the progressive establishment of conditions which enable returnees and their communities to exercise their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights, and on that basis to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives” (UNHRC, 2008:1; UNHRC, 2015). In a similar sense though, the Land Act 2009 of the government of South Sudan provides that, Reintegration ‘means the re-entry of formerly internally displaced persons into the social, economic, cultural and political fabric of their original community.’

These two definitions have some common elements but their differences are more substantial. Both mention the social, economic, cultural and political aspects. UNHRC’s definition is explicitly normative and more open ended while stressing the dynamic nature of reintegration and articulating the different aspects in terms of rights to ‘peaceful, productive and dignified lives.’ Based on this definition, the UNHRC reviewed its past approaches and experience in other post-war situations and adopted a new policy in 2008. According to the new policy document:

Return and reintegration is not a simple reversal of displacement, but a dynamic process involving individuals, households and communities that have changed as a result of their experience of being displaced…. Reintegration does not consist of “anchoring” or “re-rooting” returnees in either their places of origin or their previous social and economic roles. For example, refugees and IDPs who have experienced urban or semi-urban lifestyles during their period of displacement may well move to towns and cities upon their return (UNHRC, 2008:5).

Furthermore, the new policy is based on a ‘community and area-based approach to reintegration that makes no distinction between returning refugees, IDPs and the members of the resident population’ (UNHRC, 2008:2). This conception thus extends the programme of reintegration to different groups who are equal stakeholders. According to UNDP (2012:5)
“Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.” Essentially, it consists of providing demobilized ex-combatants and White Army with assistance to develop their livelihood options when they go back to their communities. The options could be in the areas of farming, livestock rearing, setting up small businesses and petty trades for which UNDP provides financial assistance up to a maximum of US$1,10010 (including training) which is provided through NGO implementing partners. The main goal of the reintegration programme was to provide human security, reconstruction and development, and was to take place within a comprehensive process of peace and reconciliation, post-conflict stabilization, conflict reduction and peace building.

Scope and Dynamics of IDP’s Resettlement and Reintegration Programme in South Sudan

The reintegration process was the final stage of the DDR campaign that began in 2001 in Rumbek, Lakes State and it was aimed to demobilize children associated with the army following a Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) agreement with the UN. Since 2005, more than 3,000 children were disarmed and demobilized, mainly from the Bahr el Ghazal region consisting of Western and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states. However, while some children had been reintegrated with their families and had attended vocational training, primary schools, and accelerated learning programs, many others were rearmed and remain as child soldiers for the SPLA government (US Department of State, 2013).

It is important to note that there was intense pressure on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan urging for decongestion of IDPs’ camps following the rise in the trend of arms bearing by rebel and militia groups who perpetrate atrocities within the Protection of Civilians (PoC) areas. This is particular resulting from the attacks against the POC areas by these militia groups. Unfortunately, there was yet to be any effective lasting and sustainable reintegration strategy to address and manage the situation in which large numbers of IDPs would be offloaded from camps owing to rising insecurity. Many IDPs have been forced or induced to leave the areas, without being given adequate opportunity to take a voluntary decision based on adequate information made available to them on the situation outside in their home areas or other safe options made available to them (Human Rights Council, 2014). There was no effective strategy embedded in a forward looking comprehensive approach to reintegration management and thus the offloading of IDPs without such effective reintegration strategy had resulted in further
displacement and rising numbers of new displaced persons or what is better called re-
displacement. This compounded the whole situation.

Hence, since December 2013, thousands of IDPs have been residing in South Sudan’s
capital, Juba, taking shelter in schools, churches, on open plots of land or with host families. There
were more than 200 collective centers of IDPs (such as groups living in schools or churches) in
Juba alone (Small Arms Survey, 2012). The displaced population was mainly made up of Juba
residents who, while not at high risk of targeted violence due to ethnicity or political affiliation,
have fled their homes due to generalized violence. Displaced people also came to Juba from other
states in South Sudan as they believed that the state was not on a high risk of targeted violence.
Therefore, most IDPs were not successfully reintegrated to their communities and this continued to
result in second-level displacement or re-displacement. As re-displaced people continued to arrive,
efforts to plan a response to this growing population’s needs had been very minimal. The UNHRC
did not have sufficient staff members dedicated to working with the urban displaced (International
Rescue Committee, 2014). Unfortunately, this category of IDPs, who have lost out from PoC
camps and could not be reintegrated to their communities continue to suffer great disillusionsment
and despair resulting from neglect and abandonment. During the rainy season, IDPs who only had
access to makeshift shelters and those who slept in the open were exposed to greater risk of ill-
health and secondary displacement (ACAPS, 2014). In the past, humanitarian organizations have
prepositioned aid for this group of IDPs. However, prevailing insecurity and a shortage of funding
prevented them from preparing properly (IRIN, 2014; Shanmugaratnam, 2010).

Many IDPs’ livelihoods have been disrupted as a result of poor reintegration. Insecurity
and attacks from armed groups who were rearmed in the course of the poorly organized
disarmament programmes remained a serious problem to contend with. These armed men
continued to threaten the safety of those IDPs that had left camp, without allowing them to settle
fully in their home communities. Unfortunately, the lack of effective reintegration mechanism
from the United Nations had further worsened the situation. Farmers were no longer able to
cultivate their land and herders lost their livestock or were unable to migrate with their animals.
Food production had dropped significantly as a result, and the problem was particularly acute
during the dry season, when drought had the potential to make it worse still (OCHA, 2014).

As a result of heightened attacks from rearmed militia groups, limited freedom of
movement in Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei states has disrupted people’s access to markets, some
of which had been destroyed during attacks on commercial vehicles and transport. As they were forced to travel further to buy food, women become more vulnerable to assault and sexual violence, and men were more likely to be targeted for torture and killing. The worst hit areas were Jonglei and Unity states, which also host the highest number of IDPs. The government and humanitarians were unable to improve the situation, thus, households in some parts of Jonglei and Unity faced the risk of descending into famine (Protection Cluster, 2014).

Armed groups had occupied most neighbourhoods and local facilities. Re-displaced children could not gain access to education. There continued to be cases of vulnerable children who faced severe psychosocial stress of re-displacement as they could not be reunited with their families. There continued to be rising cases of family separation and human rights abuses. All parties to the conflict had increasingly used child soldiers, and an estimated 9,000 have been recruited. Displacement sites and settlements may serve as recruiting grounds for both children and adults (UNMISS, 2014).

Therefore, as the fighting in parts of South Sudan continued between Government forces and rebels despite ceasefire talks, more and more civilians are fleeing to neighbouring countries for safety. For instance, some 2,500 people a day now seek refuge in Uganda (United Nations News Center, 2014). The table below depicts the trend of South Sudanese IDPs who have fled to neighbouring countries to seek refuge and settlement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>190,326</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>128,964</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>102,695</td>
<td>165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>43,830</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>465,815</td>
<td>715,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Rescue Committee (2014)

However, there were more than half-million Sudanese refugees, mostly in neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. Inter-communal and inter-ethnic conflicts, attacks by the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and intermittent famines had also contributed to displacements including long-distance migration (International Rescue Committee, 2014). Many South Sudanese IDPs have become refugees in neighbouring states as a
result of the inability of the United Nations to completely reintegrate and resettle them in their native communities in South Sudan.

United Nations Strategies for the Reintegration and Resettlement of Displaced IDPs

The UNHRC, along with its partners such as UNDP and World Bank, has been taking initiatives to more effectively mainstream reintegration activities within nationally led development processes. These initiatives have yet to produce significant results due to inadequate funding and differences in priorities and planning cycles between humanitarian and development partners (ECHACP, 2015). While highlighting this shortcoming, UNHRC set out the following key principles and practices as the basis of its reintegration policy.

• National responsibility and ownership
• Rights, justice and reconciliation
• Participatory and community-based approaches
• Situational analysis
• Early preparation and planning
• Pragmatism and flexibility
• Factoring returnees and returnee areas into recovery programmes and funding (Shanmugaratnam, 2010).

It must be noted that UNHRC’s operations have mainly focused on returning refugees in some of the border states of South Sudan (such as greater Equatoria, and Blue Nile which are the states receiving most of the returning refugees) although its policy framework based on the above principles is relevant to resettlement and reintegration in general, i.e. both to returning IDPs and refugees. In September 2008, UNHRC’s Policy Development and Evaluation Unit released an independent evaluation of its returnee reintegration programme carried out by a team led by Mark Duffield (Duffield et al 2008). The evaluation team, while giving credit to UNHRC for achieving a major success in supporting the voluntary repatriation of refugees and for the positive results in some of the reintegration activities, observed that ‘more could have been done, and it could have been done better’, regarding reintegration. Shanmugaratnam (2010) puts down the most relevant findings of Duffield et al: (i) focus on repatriation and less emphasis on reintegration (ii) weak or non-existing government structures and competence (iii) original programme reduced to some community-based reintegration (CBR) activities due to lack of
funds, and (iv) skewed distribution of CBRPs and delayed reintegration interventions. Initially, reintegration interventions especially Community Based Reintegration Programmes (CBRP) were concentrated in Central and Western Equatoria, which received organized returns from the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Subsequently, organized returns to Eastern Equatoria began in a big way but UNHCR was unable to achieve an equitable distribution of CBRPs in proportion to the diverse scales of organized returns in Equatoria Guinea as a whole. For instance, Western Equatoria with 22 percent of the organized returns had more than 50 percent of the CBRPs whereas Eastern Equatoria with 35 percent of the organized returns had less than 20 percent of the CBRPs. Moreover, unlike in the west where reintegration support began in advance of returns, it was undertaken retroactively in the east (Shanmugaratnam, 2010).

**United Nations and Challenges of Resettlement and Reintegration of IDPs**

The DDR programme that was seen to be providing a ‘package’ worth about US$ 1,100 to demobilized ex-combatants had become an end in itself. Several factors account for this flaw, and this made it difficult for the United Nations to handle the re-integration programme under the UNDP framework. First is that in the context of conflict and insecurity at community levels, the overriding emphasis on providing benefits (especially in the form of money) to individual ex-combatants made no positive impact on security, peace and stabilization. Particularly, adopting an individual-based reintegration programme rather than a community-based one placed the burden of economic and social reintegration primarily on the shoulders of the communities absorbing the ex-combatants. Again, there was implementation of DDR in near-total isolation from other conflict resolution mechanisms such as reduction of small and light weapons, peace building, stabilization initiatives in the country (UNDP, 2012).

The UNDP report (2012) stated that the reintegration programme in South Sudan was insufficiently decentralized and embedded in the broader peace-building and development programming in the country and did not focus enough on building capacities of line-ministries and local government to make reintegration efforts sustainable. Capacities of local government and civil society to provide effective and equitable support to the ex-combatants and communities were insufficient and local Government and traditional structures for managing
small arms, conflict resolution and dispute management were weak and in some instances dysfunctional.

Importantly, each package for the demobilized groups comprises training and financial assistance (through provision of materials, equipment, tools) to enable a demobilized beneficiary to engage in a vocation or livelihood activity of his/her choice. The average package per beneficiary comprises two main components – a direct assistance worth US$800, and another US$700 going toward training, monitoring and follow up, and programme management/overhead cost of the implementing agency. After a slow start during 2010, the delivery of reintegration packages picked up momentum during 2011-12, and latest data show that the programme has already covered 20,350 of the 36,254 demobilized ex-combatants and WAAF/G, and another 4,451 were already registered with implementing partners for receiving assistance (CIA, 2016; Cohen, 2014).

A large number of cases, recipients sold their package (including sheep, goat, cattle) to raise badly needed cash either to pay off old loans, or for medical expenses or children’s education. Implementing partners reports after 4-6 weeks of distribution showed this to average about 20-30%, but actual figure was much higher. Again, majority of the beneficiaries stated that given an option, they would have opted for cash (UNDP, 2012).

Despite realizations by both UNHRC and UNDP, the community component of the programme has remained limited by the investment made in it – total spent so far since its inception has been less than one million dollars, with funding coming from Japan and Norway for this component. By any analysis, this appears small, if one takes into account the fact that nearly $25 million has been spent on providing reintegration assistance to about 20,000 individuals, large number of who were probably financially better-off than most other members of the community, and would not have normally been qualified to be target of any development or humanitarian assistance, except for the fact that a political process agreed some seven years ago gifted them this bonanza (UNDP, 2012b:20). The UNDP stated that:

In this context both ex-combatants and individual community members feel alienated from the state by the lack of development and social services available in their communities. In this context, an individual centred reintegration approach risks sending the wrong message to communities, which are increasingly coming to view the DDR programme as a way of appeasing the former
combatants. The message that comes across is that the only way to access the economic/development assistance is by participating in violence.”

On the cost side, UNDP-DDR seems to think that they have got the package right – each ex-combatant and Women associated with Armed Forces (WAAF) getting a direct assistance equivalent to US$ 800, with additional US$ 200 going into training, US$ 100 into monitoring and follow up, and US$ 400 as programme support and management cost for the implementing partner. From experiences in other countries, including Somalia which is known by the international aid system for its high operating cost (with all operations being run from Nairobi), the operating, support and training cost (US$ 700 per beneficiary) appeared excessive, especially because the delivery was conducted over a very short period, without much of a process follow up (except one visit and a few phone calls). The entire exercise from counseling to training through to procurement, delivery and completion follow-up was done almost on an assembly-line production basis (UNDP, 2012). It is therefore seriously in doubt whether or not providing cash assistance, instead of in-kind assistance, would be more efficient, cost-effective, and would deliver better value for money for the beneficiaries, should UNDP continue to deliver economic packages like it did in the process.

The United Nations lacked the capacity to effectively handle the resettlement of large populations of returnees due to insufficient funding from donors. The organization has so far focused exclusively on return to areas of origin as the only durable solution for IDPs and returning refugees. There were no considerations for most IDPs who preferred to integrate in the towns they fled to, or to settle in other urban areas, to better access services and livelihoods. The inability to control the rising security challenges in these places had discouraged these IDPs and returning refugees from adapting completely and getting resettled after being displaced (UNOCHA, 2015).

No comprehensive approach has worked effectively in curbing some of the other problems related to displacement and resettlement such as widespread land grabs and illegal land sales, forcible occupation of community land by soldiers of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and the violation of the principle of free and voluntary return by some local authorities who demolished the homes of IDPs without giving them sufficient notice (Brewer, 2010).
It is reported that inter-communal conflicts over resources tended to turn violent quite easily due to the large supply of small arms among civilians in post-war South Sudan. That shows that the disarmament programme of the government offered such wide spectrum and latitude for re-equipping militant groups who not only continue to terrorize the communities but also scare away returning IDPs and refugees. Especially as Human Rights Watch (2009) reports, the poor progress in disarmament of civilians and demobilization of former soldiers is a factor contributing to the turmoil.

To compound the problem is that the United Nations could not manage the critical situation of effectively reintegrating South Sudanese IDPs who have been refugees in other neighbouring countries but have decided to return home following reassurance of protection at home from the government. For instance, in 2007, around 2 million people of South Sudanese origin, who had been IDPs/refugees before independence, have returned from Sudan. A number of factors, however, including harassment, discrimination and poor living conditions, mean that most feel they have little choice but to return to Sudan despite the uncertainty that awaits them there. The returns were largely on voluntary basis. It is so unfortunate nonetheless that coming home could mean more threat, attacks and suffering for the returnees. There was no sustainable logistical operation to facilitate the reintegration and wellbeing of the returning IDPs. Returnees suffered abuses, such as armed attacks, killings, gender-based violence, recruitment of child soldiers, and forced labor. Returnees also faced delayed allocation of land, lack of basic services, inability to obtain transportation to their final destinations, and lack of employment (US Department of State, 2013). Returnees' choice of final destination was restricted. Urban land was expensive and rural land, though offered free as a part of a government policy to encourage returns, may be in areas unfamiliar to them. Returnees to such areas have no social networks to rely on and they were often left without any real service provision, transport or communications infrastructure. Some returnees were given land in areas prone to flooding, thus exposing them to the risk of renewed re-displacement (Human Rights Council, 2014).

Many returnees were eventually compelled to relocate to urban centres in search of better livelihoods and services, despite the fact that they only had skills to live a rural life in the villages. This scenario continues to even discourage greater number of returnees. There has not been any durable foundation for local integration or resettlement. Given that some of the poorest
families continued to move for many years after their initial displacement, there is very little understanding of the issue. The conflict displaced huge numbers of people, but the fluid nature of the violence has not enabled others to go back to their places of origin. Some IDPs from Pibor county in Jonglei state returned home at the beginning of 2014, after the government and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (Cobra Faction) signed a cessation of hostilities agreement. Pibor county had been the epicenter of violence in South Sudan since mid-2013 (Small Arms Survey, 2014). Other return movements had taken place in Bor (ACAPS, 2014). All these have been met with minimal resettlement package.

Problems of Financing Resettlement and Reintegration Program in South Sudan

The consequences for the 12 million people of South Sudan have been devastating and outpaced aid agencies’ ability to keep up with the tide of humanitarian crisis and people’s suffering. Although there was continuing strong support from donors to the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), with deposits of $160 million for 2014. Total contributions exceeded those in 2012 by 36 per cent and in 2013 by 75 per cent, reflecting a marked increase in the level of humanitarian need, sustained resource mobilization activities throughout the year. However, this had not tangibly lessened the plights and needs of the IDPs in South Sudan. As of mid-2015, almost 8 million people in South Sudan were food insecure. Some 4.6 million people were severely food insecure. Some 2.1 million people have had to flee from their homes. In half of the country, one in every three children were acutely malnourished and 250,000 children faced starvation. This was the situation which confronted the aid community, a group of non-governmental organizations and UN agencies committed to providing the best protection and assistance to people in need, on time, based on the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.

In fact, as at mid 2015, the financial requirement management of the needs of the IDPs in South Sudan stood at a whooping sum of US$1.63 billion, of which donors were only able to put down US$656 million. This was only about 25 percent of the total financial requirements for the year if adequate care of the material needs of internally displaced persons must be met in the country. Resources were grossly insufficient, including for air assets to facilitate rapid response missions, the delivery of survival kits and to re-supply IDPs in deep field locations. The table below provides the financial requirements of the IDPs per cluster in a given year.
Table 2: Financial Requirements for Managing Per Cluster of IDPs Camp Per Year

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Coordination and camp management</td>
<td>$67.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and common services</td>
<td>$32.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>$41 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Telecommunications</td>
<td>$1.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food security and livelihood</td>
<td>$623.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>$93.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>$114.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine action</td>
<td>$14.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-food items and emergency shelter</td>
<td>$65.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>$149 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>$60 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee response</td>
<td>$241 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water, Sanitation and hygiene</td>
<td>$129.5 million</td>
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Whereas the requirements for food and livelihood differently converged at an average of $1.2 million each in 2011; also $1.2 million each in 2012 each; $2.3 million each in 2011; $3.2 million each in 2014; in the year 2015 the both items stood at and $4.6 million each. In addition, the figures of new internally displaced persons in South Sudan rose dramatically. For instance, the figures of newly admitted IDPs was 5,000 in 2011; 3,000 in 2012; 200,000 in 2013; 1.5 million in 2014; 1.95 million in 2015 (UNOCHA, 2015). This trend shows that following the Comprehensive Peace Accord and the July independence the figures of new IDPs declined considerably but rose tremendously afterwards in the coming years between 2013 and 2015 following the outbreak of the conflicts within the factions of the ruling party who utilized the military, militia groups and other security forces to make the country unstable.

It is questionable, however, whether such returns of estimated 1.95 million people will be sustainable, given the prevailing insecurity and lack of services in many areas. Access to adequate accommodation is also an issue. All parties to the conflict had destroyed housing, in some cases burning or destroying entire villages meaning that transitional solutions such as improving living conditions in displacement areas were absolutely of great concern (Protection Cluster, 2014). As displacement and problems of resettlement became protracted, IDPs and armed groups occupying other people’s property and land increased, which in turn led to future conflicts. This amounts to secondary occupation which has already been reported in Juba.
Vulnerable groups and women in particular are disproportionately affected, given their weaker inheritance and land rights. Land disputes and uncertain tenure which were already a concern before the current crisis, were further complicated by the lack of formal demarcation and deeds, and cumbersome and costly legal processes (Protection Cluster, 2014). Procedures for resolving disputes between displaced and host communities were not specified and this made it extremely difficult to ensure that the both groups’ housing, land and property rights were respected and future tensions and conflict prevented.

National authorities made efforts to provide relief and engage in the return process before the crisis, but a lack of comprehensive data and understanding of displacement hampered an effective response. The vast size of the country poses significant governance challenges, and the government has also struggled to fulfill its leadership role in humanitarian and development coordination bodies (Amnesty International, 2014). Both government and opposition forces have restricted access by obstructing aid delivery, looting supplies, harassing aid workers and imposing bureaucratic impediments (United Nations, 2014; IRC, May 2014). Generally, the vast majority of people that have been re-displaced are outside bases and formal camps: many are in remote areas and face continued threats to their security, resulting in repeated displacement. This fluid displacement patterns in rural areas has made it difficult for humanitarian agencies to reach all those in need of assistance.

Conclusion

The study examined United Nations and challenges of resettlement and reintegration of IDPs in South Sudan. The study showed that the United Nations has faced serious challenges and has been unable to effectively resettle and reintegrate South Sudan IDPs and refugees who have been affected by the ongoing violent conflict in the country. Particularly, IDPs continue to suffer lack of enabling accommodation, sustainable livelihood and effective reintegration into their original communities and social life. This is as a result of a number of factors such as unsustainable funding streams from international humanitarian partners, institutional challenges and logistics problems which combined to undercut United Nations attempts to achieve effective resettlement and reintegration of IDPs in South Sudan.
The study therefore showed that the DDR programme in general and implementation of the reintegration component in particular had yet to achieve any tangible success. There was implementation of DDR in near-total isolation from other conflict resolution mechanisms such as reduction of small and light weapons, peace building, human development and stabilization initiatives in the country. Again, capacities of local government and civil society to provide effective and equitable support to the ex-combatants and communities are insufficient. Therefore there is need to implement enhanced funding component of United Nations intervention in South Sudan especially through increased funding of resettlement and reintegration programmes. Serious efforts should also be made to address obvious institutional and logistics problems associated with United Nations humanitarian intervention in South Sudan.

References


